Security and Fault-tolerance in Distributed Systems Christian Cachin, IBM Research - Zurich

## **Exercise 8**

## **1** Group Key Agreement

The well-known *Diffie-Hellman* protocol provides a protocol for two parties to agree on a secret key by exchanging public messages. Recall the mathematical setting of ElGamal encryption. Parties  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  have public keys  $y_1 = g^{x_1}$  and  $y_2 = g^{x_2}$ , respectively, where  $x_1 \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q$ and  $x_2 \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q$  are the respective secret keys.  $P_1$  sends  $y_1$  to  $P_2$  and  $P_2$  computes  $c_2 = y_1^{x_2}$ . Analogously,  $P_2$  sends  $y_2$  to  $P_1$  and  $P_1$  computes  $c_1 = y_2^{x_1}$ . Note that  $c_1 = c_2$ . This value can now serve as their secret key, since no adversary who overheard the public messages gains any useful information about  $c_1$ . (In real life, one must use  $H(c_1)$  for the secret key and take several further measures to secure the protocol against man-in-the-middle attacks.)

We want to generalize the Diffie-Hellman protocol to n > 2 parties, which should all obtain the same secret key.

A simple 3-party key agreement protocol for  $P_1, P_2, P_3$  proceeds in three steps:

- 1.  $P_i$  (for i = 1, ..., 3) chooses  $x_i \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q$  and sends  $a_i = g^{x_i}$  to all;
- 2.  $P_i$  computes  $b_{j,i} = a_j^{x_i}$  for  $j \neq i$  and sends the *b* values to all; and
- 3.  $P_i$  computes  $c_i = b_{j,l}^{x_i}$  for the pair (j, l) such that  $j \neq i$  and  $l \neq i$ . Note that  $c_1 = c_2 = c_3$ .

At the end, every party obtains the same secret key  $c_1$ , but an adversary who observes all messages does not learn any useful information about  $c_1$ .

- a) Generalize this protocol to n parties such that it takes O(n) messages and the size of each message is O(n) elements of G. (It will take O(n) rounds.)
- b) How can the size of each message be reduced to a constant number of elements from G?
- c) This family of protocols assumes a model where all parties are correct, no party may even crash. The protocol protects them against an outside eavesdropper. In this model, the following *canonical* protocol would also achieve the goal of establishing a common key: one designated party chooses the group key at random; every party generates its own key pair and sends the public key to the designated party; finally, the designated party encrypts the group key

Discuss differences between the group key-agreement protocol and the canonical protocol.