



Trusted Infrastructure Cloud

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Trustworthy Cloud Workshop
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Trust in Clouds

- Outsourcing of resources (computing, network, storage) to cloud provider
- Pay-per-use
- Scalability


- ***Shared responsibility*** between cloud customer and cloud provider
- How to gain trust in cloud resources?

Trusted Infrastructure Cloud

- **Trust in remote resources:** built on top of Trusted Computing technologies
 - Integrity ensured by hardware anchor, trusted boot, security kernel, remote attestation
- **Protection against insider attacks:** administration is controlled by infrastructure
 - No administrators with elevated privileges
- **Separation of tenants:** Trusted Virtual Domains (TVD)
 - Trustworthy isolation of computing / storage / networking


TrustedServer: Security Kernel

- Isolation and Virtualisation
- Trusted Virtual Domains
- Integrity of Platform




Ensuring Integrity

- Essential Preconditions
 - Tamper Proof Hardwaremodule
 - Integrity during boot
- Integration into Infrastructure
 - Remote Attestation
 - Trustworthy integrity for remote ressources
 - Communication only between trustwortyh systems
 - Isolation of faulty / malicious systems
 - Secure Binding
 - Binding of boot process to trusted configuration
 - Only untampered security kernel is booted



Chain of Trust

Execution



m_x : $\text{hash}(X)$
Measurements of binary code X

Measurements

Chain of Trust

Turaya™ Security Kernel
measures the virtual machines

Bootloader measures
Security Kernel

BIOS^{TC} measures Bootloader

CRTM measures BIOS


Trustworthy Components

Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM)
Trusted Platform Module (TPM)


Trusted Virtual Domains (TVD)

- Core concept for
 - Simple but pervasive **information flow control**
 - Trustworthy isolation of shared computing / storage / networking resources
- Association of compartments (VMs) with security domains
 - Direct information flow only within same TVD
 - Control of all interfaces between TVDs
 - Used to separate tenants, but can also be used to separate security domains of a single tenant


TVD: Physical Network Layer




TVD: VPN-based Virtual Network Layers





CORPORATE HEADQUARTERS



LOCAL BRANCH B




LOCAL BRANCH A



- Green Trusted Virtual Domain ■
- Blue Trusted Virtual Domain ■
- Red Trusted Virtual Domain ■
- Internal Connection —
- Secured Connection —

Workflow Illustration


Step 1: Trusted Boot




https




Step 2: TrustedChannel & Remote Attestation



Step 3: Start Compartments



Integration of Commodity Cloud Storage



Conclusion

- Establish trust in remote resources by Trusted Computing technologies
 - Hardware trust anchor
 - Trusted boot ensures integrity
 - Security kernel
- Protection against insider attacks
 - Automated management / maintenance via controlled remote interfaces
 - No administrators with elevated privileges
- Trusted Virtual Domains (TVD)
 - Trustworthy isolation of computing / storage / networking
 - Information flow control
 - Transparent encryption
 - VPN

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